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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PRUDENCE OF JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT UNDER THE NEW ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
WAYNE W. WHALEN* and PAULA WOLFF**
HE 1970 Illinois Constitution substantially enhanced the con-
stitutional powers of the Illinois courts. The increased pow-
ers are, in part, generated by newly expressed constitutional
grants of power to the courts.' Reasons for creation of the newly
expressed judicial powers, often at the expense of the legislative and
executive branches, are not altogether clear. For many delegates
to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, the shift in respon-
sibility to the courts was founded upon an optimism about judicial
problem-solving generated by the activism of the Warren Court.
There was also an expressed pessimism about the capacities of the
other institutions of government, particularly the General Assembly,
to perform responsibly.2
The court's powers are also increased by the inevitable interpretive
responsibilities following the ratification of new basic law. Addi-
tionally, there were instances when the delegates were unable to agree
* B.S., United States Air Force Academy; J.D., Northwestern University
School of Law; Chairman, Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission; Member,
Judiciary Committee, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention.
** B.A., Smith College; Ph.D., University of Chicago; University Professor of
Public Administration and Constitutional Law, Governors State University.
1. The new constitution was proposed by the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention, was ratified by the voters on December 15, 1970 and became generally
effective on July 1, 1971. Ill. Const. trans. sch. §§ 1 et seq. This article does not
discuss the differences between the Judicial Articles of the 1870 and 1970 constitu-
tions. See generally Cohn, Illinois Judicial Department--Changes Effected by Con-
stitution of 1970, 1971 U. OF ILL. L. FORuM 355.
2. See, e.g., 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PRO-
CEEDINGS (1972). (Hereinafter cited as TRANSCRIPT), for a discussion of the Gen-
eral Assembly's activity in the area of. environmental control, during which Delegate
Mary Lee Leahy said: "If government is doing its job in this field, if the General
Assembly has acted properly in drawing up good legislation . . . then the indi-
vidual will have no need to act....." 4 TRANSCRIPT 2991. See also Delegate
Madigan's remarks concerning public transportation, 4 TRANSCRIPT 3518, Dele-
gate Davis' statement regarding conservation. 4 TRANSCRIPT 3486.
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upon a palatable solution to a particular problem and final resolution
was left to the courts.
The increased power of the courts under the 1970 constitution
represents potentially significant threats to the courts' traditional role
in Illinois government and to their institutional responsibilities. The
purpose of this article is to indicate areas of possible danger and to
urge that the courts approach their work in the coming decades with
prudence and restraint. A new jurisprudence characterized by tem-
perate discussion, rational dialogue and continuity of decision must
be developed to avoid the hazards for the courts inherent in this new
constitution.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part outlines the
interpretive responsibilities of the courts under the new constitution.
The second part discusses the expressed constitutional mandates to
the courts, and the final part discusses the political powers and super-
visory authority assigned the courts by the new constitution. The ar-
ticle concludes with a discussion of the institutional framework pro-
vided the courts for approaching their new responsibilities and some
comments on how institutional structure offers the opportunity for
development of the new jurisprudence.
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Shortly after the adoption of the United States Constitution, Chief
Justice John Marshall and his Court assumed the responsibility of in-
terpreting the Constitution. In Marbury v. Madison,' the Court
stated the doctrine of judicial review:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. . . . So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution; or
conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of
judicial duty. If then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.4
Coupled with this assertion of the courts' power to interpret the
Constitution and to apply it to statutory law and administrative action,
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Id. at 177-78,
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the Court also began to consider the limits of judicial power. In
Cohens v. Virginia,5 the Court said: "It is most true, that this court
will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that
it must take jurisdiction, if it should."6
The power of judicial review is not contained in the text of the
1970 constitution; nor was it contained in its predecessor.7 The
power of judicial review in the Marbury sense was, however, explicit
during many of the debates of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention.8 Today's Supreme Court of Illinois is in a position, following
the adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, almost comparable
to that of the Marshall Court in the early years of the Republic be-
cause it is generally unrestrained by the doctrine of stare decisis
when interpreting the provisions of the new constitution.f
The political possibilities offered by subsequent judicial review
were not lost on the delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention. Anticipation of judicial review provided the delegates with
the opportunity to draft intentionally ambiguous provisions for in-
clusion in the constitution. The delegates envisioned that these am-
biguities would be ultimately resolved by the courts. In some cases
delegates even expected a specific interpretation by the courts which
was politically impossible to obtain in the Constitutional Convention
for want of majority agreement on the substantive issue.
For example, the convention was closely divided on the question
of whether the ad valorem personal property tax should be abolished
5. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
6. Id. at 404.
7. Professor Wechsler's theory that the federal power of judicial review is
grounded in the text of the Federal Constitution has no application to the Illinois
theory of judicial review since his argument relies upon the language of the su-
premacy clause, and no comparable provision is included in the Illinois Constitution.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
3 (1959). See also Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40,
43 (1961).
8. See, e.g., 4 TRANSCRIPT 3157, wherein Delegate Thomas Kellegan said: "I
think the problem is still before us, and that is the question of how individual
justices sitting on the Supreme Court will interpret the language which we are
placing in this Constitution ....
9. To the extent the courts or the legislature had, prior to the adoption of
the 1970 constitution, defined terms, however, those terms should be given the same
meaning unless it is clearly apparent that some other meaning was intended. Bridge-
water v. Hotz, 51 I11. 2d 103, 109, 281 N.E.2d 317, 321 (1972).
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by the constitution. 10 The proponents of abolition introduced a suc-
cessful amendment which stated: "On or before January 1, 1979,
the General Assembly by law shall abolish all ad valorem personal
property taxes .... 11
The intent of some of the proponents was clear. The ad valorem
personal property tax would be unconstitutional and therefore un-
collectable after 1979 no matter what the General Assembly did.
The opponents of abolition, on the other hand, contended that the
amendment was simply a mandate to the General Assembly and
that without legislative action the ad valorem personal property tax
could continue to be imposed. Rather than face the issue squarely
and provide any definite language as to whether or not the tax would
be abolished, the convention approved an ambiguous amendment
which will probably be interpreted in the courts. Thus, the courts,
not the convention, must resolve the political question.
Perhaps the section of the new constitution most illustrative of the
deferring of politically difficult decisions by the convention to the
courts is the home rule provision of the local government article.' 2
Article VII, section 6(a) provides: "Except as limited by this Sec-
tion, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any func-
tion pertaining to its government and affairs. . . ." The Committee
on Local Government recognized the amorphous nature of the pro-
vision granting a local governmental unit powers pertaining to "its
government and affairs." However, it resisted efforts to define
precisely those powers.' The convention, as a whole, was similarly
10. For a discussion of the history of the abolition of the ad valorem personal
property tax at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, see Kamin, Constitu-
tional Abolition of Ad Valorem Personal Property Taxes: A Looking-Glass Book,
60 ILL. B.J. 432 (1972). See also 5 TRANSCRIPT 3758-59, 3822-39.
11. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(c).
12. For a detailed discussion of the problems concerning the interpretation of
the home rule provisions, see generally Vitullo, Recent Developments in Local Gov-
ernment Law in Illinois, this issue; Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule
(Part 1): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 137.
13. Instead members of the Local Government Committee argued that the
constitution should include a provision stating that home rule powers be "liberally
construed." The reasoning behind this was stated by Delegate David Stahl when
he said: "It's precisely because the Courts have acted in a confused and often very
conservative way with regard to the grant of home rule power that . . . many ...
on the Local Government Committee, feel that the inclusion of this kind of a
statement for whatever effect it will have on the Courts is worthwhile and neces-
sary." 4 TRANSCRIPT 3138-39. Some delegates contended there was a limited role
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unwilling to be specific. Thus, it will inevitably fall to the courts to
delineate in a case by case basis the power of home rule units.' 4
The courts' interpretive task under the home rule provision is pre-
dictably monumental. For example, there is the question of whether
regulation of transportation is a local or a state function. Certainly
to the extent that a commuter train or bus travels into the jurisdic-
tion of a governmental unit or a metropolitan region, other than the
home rule unit asserting jurisdiction, it would seem unlikely that the
regulation of such transportation would exclusively belong to the
home rule unit. The question of jurisdiction over the regulation of
transportation is further complicated by the inclusion in the 1970
constitution of the transportation section which states that "[t]he
General Assembly by law may provide for, aid, and assist public
transportation. . . within the State."'
Thus, even using a restrained view of their interpretive role, the
courts are faced with substantial and difficult issues of interpretation
which cannot be avoided. In such cases, the interpretations will
concern highly volatile political issues, such as abolition of the per-
sonal property tax, the powers of home rule units or the authority of
the Attorney General, which the convention was unable to resolve.
The convention intentionally deferred these political decisions by
leaving interpretation of an ambiguous text to the courts.
To this extent, it appears that the Convention did not properly
perform its charge. In a political body such as the Convention,
compromise is not only expected but proper. In some instances, the
delegates did agree to compromise. Often, under such circumstances,
for the courts in defining the line between home rule and statewide powers. Park-
hurst, Article VII-Local Government 52 CHI. B. REc. 94, 100 (1970).
14. This is a substantial departure from the precedent under which the court
applied Dillon's rule which stated that local governments had only those powers
expressly granted by the General Assembly by law and that any grant of powers
would be strictly construed by the courts. Professor Baum suggests that the Gen-
eral Assembly is primarily responsible under the 1970 constitutional scheme for
establishing the relationship between the state and home rule units. "[T]he
Courts should step in to compensate for legislative inaction or oversight only in
the clearest cases of oppression, injustice, or interference by local ordinances with
vital state policies." Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Parti):
Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 137, 157. However, the su-
preme court appears to have rejected this argument in at least one instance. Bridge-
man v. Korzen, - Ill. 2d - (Docket No. 45290) (1972). Compare City of
Evanston v. County of Cook, - Ill. 2d - (Docket No. 45132) (1972).
15. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 7. See Baum, supra note 12, at 152-56.
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the ultimate resolution of a political problem was deferred to the Gen-
eral Assembly.1" Sometimes, when a compromise was reached by ex-
pressing the terms of the bargain in the document, there was proper
consideration of the issues in the document. 17 The propriety of the
Convention's action is less clear, however, where a constitutional
compromise was reached by including in the constitution ambiguous
language, with various delegates claiming different interpretations.
The result is that the political solution to the problem has been in-
tentionally and improperly deferred to the courts for determination.
Notwithstanding the serious institutional questions facing the courts
which are raised by the necessity for interpreting clauses in the new
document which were deliberately left ambiguous, the Supreme Court
of Illinois has seemed to assume an aggressive posture in interpreting
the new constitution and, indeed, to have reached unnecessarily to
decide other constitutional questions. In the process, the supreme
court seems to have intruded upon the prerogatives of both the legis-
lative and executive branches by developing new constitutional doc-
trine which is not entirely consistent from case to case and under
which the principles of decision are obscure. Several recent decisions
illustrate this aggressiveness.
In Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen,18 the supreme court was
called upon to interpret the validity of the 1970 constitutional ref-
erendum concerning Proposition IX-A, approved by an overwhelming
majority of the voters, which abolished the ad valorem personal prop-
erty tax on "individuals." Proposition IX-A, amended the 1870 con-
stitution but its effect was to carry forward to the 1970 constitution
when it was ratified. 9 The effect of the provision was to abolish
the ad valorem property tax on "individuals" and to leave the tax
imposed upon other taxpayers. The court held the abolition uncon-
stitutional under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution on the theory that it could not rationally be said that
16. See e.g. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 3, which provides "Except as the General
Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished."
17. See ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 8.
18. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 IIl. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592(1971). The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in the
Korzen case. Lenhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 405 U.S. 1039 (1972). At
the time of the writing of this Article, the case is fully briefed but not argued.
19. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5(b).
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the prohibition of payment of ad valorem property taxes by individuals
promotes "any policy other than a desire to free one set of property
owners from the burden of a tax imposed upon another set."2  The
court relied upon the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania." However, it was the ma-
jority in Quaker City, not Mr. Justice Brandeis, which held that a
distinction between a corporate taxpayer and other taxpayers could
not be drawn for purposes of a state corporate gross receipts tax.
The Quaker City dissenting opinion relied upon by the Illinois court
took the position that a rational basis did exist for distinguishing be-
tween corporate and individual taxpayers.2 While the Illinois Su-
preme Court cited the doctrine, frequently stated by the United States
Supreme Court, that a classification is not arbitrary or violative of
the equal protection clause if any set of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain the classification,2" it is difficult to under-
stand why Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement of the numerous reasons
for distinguishing corporate and individual taxpayers in Quaker City
does not meet the equal protection test. A year later in Doran v.
Cullerton 4 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a homestead exemption
from real estate taxes for taxpayer-home owners over sixty-five. In
Doran, where the sole distinction was between two classes of owners,
one over sixty-five and one under sixty-five, the court did not refer
to or distinguish Korzen.25
Several lines of Illinois Supreme Court decisions under the 1870
constitution were non-reconcilable and were restrictive on the state's
20. 49 I11. 2d at 151; 273 N.E.2d at 599.
21. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
22. Id. at 411.
23. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-551 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The Dandridge Court stated, "In the area
of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the equal protection
clause merely because the classification . . . 'is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.'"
24. Doran v. Cullerton, 51 111. 2d 553, 283 N.E.2d 865 (1972).
25. The Doran court sought to support its conclusion that a rational basis for
the distinction between property owners exists by referring to the federal and
state income tax exemptions for the elderly. Id. at 559-60, 283 N.E.2d at 868.
The use of this analogy is surprising since the Korzen majority failed to meet the
arguments of Mr. Justice Davis' dissent that since a distinction between corporate
and individual taxpayers was constitutional for federal and state income tax pur-
poses, the equal protection test was met for ad valorem personal property tax-
payers as well. 49 Ill. 2d at 156-57, 273 N.E.2d at 602-3.
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revenue raising powers, and thus provided a major reason for calling
the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention. The convention sought
to avoid a similar development under the 1970 constitution." How-
ever, Korzen and Doran appear to be setting precedent that may en-
danger this goal. The difficulty facing the convention in drafting
adequate revenue provisions is illustrated by the remarks of Delegate
James Thompson in discussing two alternative drafts relating to the
taxation of real property:
My personal preference would be-now that we are where we are-would be to
leave them both in and let the court knock out what they want to; and I think
this would be the-apparently-the only solution left to us, .... So let's leave
this in, and perhaps the Supreme Court will knock it out .... 27
While the courts obviously have a responsibility to apply the pro-
visions of the constitution to all statutes and administrative action, the
courts should carefully defer to the General Assembly on questions
where more than one interpretation can be placed upon a revenue
statute. This would be somewhat similar to the equal protection test
applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Jefferson v.
Hackney 8 and Dandridge v. Williams" cases.
To avoid an aggressive interpretation of the revenue article pro-
visions by the courts which might invalidate taxing legislation,
the new constitution vests exclusive power in the General Assembly
to impose taxes. "The General Assembly has the exclusive power to
raise revenue by law except as limited or otherwise provided in this
Constitution. 3 0  Of course, the courts must apply all the provisions
of Article IX to any revenue statute and should do so. These pro-
visions, as they relate to both property and non-property taxes, are,
however, limitations upon General Assembly power which, as a gen-
eral proposition, is plenary. As such, the limitations should be con-
strued narrowly, and it would be only under the most extraordinary
circumstances, both as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter
26. G. BRADEN AND R. CorN, ThE ILLINOIS CONSTrTUTION: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 422-32 (1969). See also Young, The Revenue Ar-
ticle of the Illinois Constitution of 1970-An Analysis and Appraisal, 1972
U. oF ILL. L. FORUM 312.
27. 5 TRANSCRIPT at 3909.
28. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
29. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
30. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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of public policy, that these provisions would seem appropriately ap-
plied to invalidate taxing legislation. 1
In People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett,3 2 the supreme court interpret-
ed the amendatory veto provisions of the new constitution. This veto
section represents a substantial departure from the old provision and
permits the Governor to return to the General Assembly a bill, which
it had previously passed, with his "specific recommendations for
change.'33 In the Klinger case, the bills related to financial assistance
for non-public education. After the passage of the bills by the
General Assembly, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases
which clearly would have made the proposed legislation unconstitu-
tional under federal standards. 34  Before signing the bills, the Gover-
nor changed some of the provisions to bring the proposed legislation
into compliance with the recent Supreme Court decisions. The subject
matter of the Governor's amendatory recommendations expressly
related to the financial assistance for non-public education. The
bills also contained the same appropriation of funds as the prior bills.
Nevertheless, the court struck down the bills which had been ap-
proved, as amended, by the General Assembly on the grounds that
the Governor had improperly exercised the amendatory veto powers.
The court said that while the record of the Convention and the text
of the constitution were imprecise, it was clear that the amendatory
veto provision was not intended to permit the complete substitution
of new bills for old ones.3 5  This interpretation of the language
seems beyond dispute; its application is less clear. As pointed out
above, the altered bills did pertain to the same subject matter and
contained the same appropriation as the old bills. The amended
bills did not contain a completely new text but relied extensively on
the older provisions.
The new constitution does not expressly impose qualitative or quan-
titative restrictions upon the Governor's power to make specific rec-
ommendations for change but the court seemed to suggest that such
31. Professor Young suggests that a different standard of review might apply
when a statute is being tested against the uniformity provision of Section 2 of
article IX. Young, supra note 26, at 317.
32. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 50 I11. 2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
33. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e).
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971).
35. 50 IM. 2d at 249, 278 N.E.2d at 88.
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restrictions existed. To the extent that any limitation should pertain,
it would seem that the ordinary interpretive rule that any amendment
must be germane to the subject matter would apply. The court, how-
ever, was apparently dissatisfied with that rule and, while not artic-
ulating any other, suggested that there was a more appropriate stand-
ard somewhere between being germane and the power to make simple
grammatical corrections. 6
After the amended bills had been approved by the General Assem-
bly, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate had signed the bills which certified that "the procedural
requirements for passage" were met. 7 Thus both the executive and
legislative branches indicated by procedural certification that they
were in agreement that the laws reflected the substantive views of the
two lawmaking branches of government. Nevertheless, in Klinger,
the court injected itself into the procedural steps of the passage of
legislation after the other two branches had agreed that such legis-
lation was validly "passed." However, the constitution has committed
to the other branches, not to the courts, the autonomous determination
of this issue. 8  In short, such procedural requirements, by virtue of
certification, seemed not to be open to judicial review.
In County of Cook v. Ogilvie, 9 the issue before the courts was the
power of the Governor to transfer a portion of the public aid appro-
priation from the general assistance category to the aid to families with
dependent children category, a program also included in the public
aid appropriation. The appropriations bill provided that the director
of the Illinois Department of Public Aid could transfer funds, with the
approval of the Governor, between the programs as the need arose.
The director, with the approval of the Governor, made the transfer,
but the Circuit Court of Cook County directed the director and the
Governor to retransfer the funds to the original categories. On ap-
peal, the supreme court found that the transfer provision of the ap-
propriations act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative pow-
36. Id. See also discussion at note 62 infra.
37. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
38. Compare 1970 ILL. CONST., art. IV, § 13 which expressly provides for
judicial review to determine if a law is or can be given "general" application. See
note 49, inlra, and accompanying text.
39. County of Cook v. Ogilvie, 50 Ill. 2d 379, 280 N.E.2d 224 (1972). W.
Whalen was one of the counsel for appellants in this case.
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er to the executive branch. It also held that the injunction issued by
the Circuit Court of Cook County requiring the Governor to take
specific action was valid.
What the court did not say in the Cook County case is important.
The court's decision does not include consideration of the long line
of Illinois cases which holds that a court may not direct the Governor
to take specific executive action. In People ex rel Bruce v. Dunn,
for example, the court said, "[I]n view of the division of powers
of government there is no power on the part of the courts to enforce by
mandamus the performance of any duty, whether discretionary or
ministerial, imposed upon the chief executive by virtue of his office."40
In Cook County, the Supreme Court of Illinois, without discussion
of these cases or generally of their effect upon the inter-relationships
among the three branches of government, simply ordered the Gov-
ernor to take executive action.
In the Cook County case, as in Klinger, the Illinois Supreme Court
injected itself into the delicate question of institutional distribution
of power. The ramifications of such action are especially graphic
in the Cook County case. For one thing, it is not altogether clear
what sanctions could have been imposed on the Governor had he
refused to obey the court order. Furthermore, in the Cook County
case, by the time the decision had reached the Supreme Court
of Illinois, the funds (having been retransferred pursuant to the low-
er court order) were completely expended and therefore, the case was
arguably moot. The court, however, rejected the executive branch
claim of mootness and decided the case.
With both of these problems come the traditional considerations
which enter into judicial restraint.4 With the court's direction for
executive action, the doctrine of the political question is raised in
its starkest form;41 since the funds at issue had been spent, the issue
of ripeness presents itself for consideration.
Naturally, the court is cognizant of the importance of these fun-
damental questions which must be considered before entering into the
40. People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunn, 258 Il1. 441, 447, 101 N.E. 560, 562-63
(1913). See also MacGregor v. Miller, 324 Ill. 113, 120, 154 N.E. 707, 711
(1926); People ex rel. Bacon v. Cullom, 100 Ill. 472, 472-73 (1881); People
ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 230-32, 68 Am. Dec. 591, 592-93 (1858).
41. Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L REv. 40, 42-47 (1961).
42. See cases at note 40, supra.
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decision-making process in any case. The significance of the ques-
tions is, however, increased during the consideration of cases develop-
ing under a new constitution. Moreover, the supreme court's impact
on trial courts' attitudes concerning judicial restraint is pronounced.
Whatever the reasons may be for restraint at the appellate and su-
preme court level, they should be all the more compelling on trial
courts. Nonetheless, much of the major legislation enacted by the
77th General Assembly was constitutionally invalidated by the Cook
County Circuit Court, including, inter alia, the No Fault Insurance
Law, the Illinois Ethics Act, Aid to Non-Public Schools, the 1972
Public Aid Appropriations and the Homestead Exemption on Real
Property Taxes for the Elderly.43 We are not concerned here with
the correctness of these decisions but rather their impact on the judi-
cial process. In some cases the supreme court has upheld the trial
courts and in others they have been reversed.
Nevertheless, the lines of cases set forth above suggest the court
is not only establishing a pattern of increased judicial activism under
the 1970 document, but it is also re-examining fundamental questions
about the overall functioning of government. This re-examination is
occurring despite the fact that the traditional court involvement in
interpreting the constitution is, in 1972, dangerously magnified by
intentional ambiguities concerning important political issues in the
language of the 1970 Constitution.
STATED JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The social issues viewed by delegates to the Sixth Illinois Con-
stitutional Convention as the most dramatic and pressing facing them
were: (1) discrimination on the basis of race, creed, national ancestry
or sex in employment and in housing, and (2) protection of the envi-
ronment for future generations of citizens of Illinois. The convention
approached the problem of discrimination by enacting section 17 of
article I of the new constitution which provides:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis
of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices
of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
43. One major legislative program declared constitutional was the transporta-
tion program where an original action was brought in the supreme court. People
ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d 87 (1971).
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These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
Discrimination of the type prohibited by section 17, if committed by
a government, is probably prohibited by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the comparable
provisions of the 1970 constitution.44 Section 17 extends the freedom
from discrimination to a sphere beyond governmental action, how-
ever, and prohibits private persons from discriminating in employment
or in the sale and rental of property. While the provisions in the first
paragraph of section 17 are arguably enforceable in the courts without
an expressed grant of jurisdiction,45 the constitutional convention de-
cided to take no chances-particularly in view of what was believed by
many to be inaction by the General Assembly and the courts in pro-
viding protection for these important rights. Thus the second para-
graph of section 17 represents a departure from the prior Illinois
Constitution and grants individuals a right to enforce the substantive
provisions of the first paragraph in the courts without action by the
General Assembly.
Providing protection from discrimination is a traditional respon-
sibility of the courts. The courts are viewed as peculiarly suited
to resolving such issues, and these questions have been generally
recognized as within the proper institutional role of courts. Thus,
this provision does not represent a sharp departure from precedent
with respect to judicial functions.
The second issue mandating action from the courts does represent,
however, a departure from such traditional understandings. The
granting of the power to enforce another substantive right was extend-
ed by the convention in section 2 of Article XI which provides:
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce
this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General As-
sembly may provide by law.
This section of the environmental article takes the courts onto untest-
ed ground. Section 2 grants persons the right to "a healthful environ-
ment." Unlike the right to freedom from "racial discrimination"
44. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
45. Compare Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), with Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949).
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which has proved to be subject to judicial definition with a certain
amount of precision, and with respect to which the courts have ex-
ercised a traditional and well-defined role, the right to a "healthful
environment" will probably cause substantive difficulties for the courts.
Questions of what is and what is not a healthful environment are,
in large part, scientific. For example, massive amounts of technical
evidence are necessary to determine what constitutes a certain level
of harmful noise pollution. Additionally, what constitutes harmful
sulphur content in emissions from an industrial plant would appear
to be essentially a scientific question. The Committee on General
Government, which proposed the language found in section 2 of the
environmental article stated:
The word "healthful" is meant to describe that quality of physical environment
which a reasonable man would select for himself were a free choice available ....
ET]he word "environment" means the aggregate of all conditions affecting the exist-
ence, growth and welfare of organisms. 4 6
Of course, it is not altogether clear that a case-by-case resolution
of the question of what amounts to a "healthful environment" is gov-
ernmentally and socially the most desirable means of achieving a
"healthful environment."
The convention, however, believed that the right to a "healthful
environment" was so compelling that the right should be constitution-
ally protected from abridgement by the General Assembly. More-
over, the convention was unwilling to leave to statutory law the ques-
tion of how this right was to be implemented and guaranteed. There-
fore, section 2 expressly provides that the right can be enforced
through appropriate legal proceedings. The General Government
Committee said: " 'Appropriate legal proceedings' is meant to in-
clude law suits, administrative proceedings, and any other legal pro-
ceedings." 47  This understanding of the role of courts raises serious
questions about judicial as opposed to legislative determination of
policy. In the legislative process, interest group pressures are es-
sential to the resolution of particular problems, and "policy" ques-
tions such as the impact on the economy of a decision in a particular
area-or indeed the state or the nation-are considered essential to
the policy resolution. Under section 2, such a process is not man-
46. 6 TRANSCRIPT 701.
47. Id. at 705.
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dated and the introduction of such considerations is virtually fore-
closed. Questions about the definition and application of the right to
a healthful environment are to be resolved-not by the General As-
sembly and not by the executive branch-but by the courts in sep-
arate legal proceedings. This is a major, new and difficult responsi-
bility for the courts which cannot be avoided since the duty is ex-
pressly imposed by the constitution.
In other areas, the role of the courts is enlarged through express
grants of power. No procedural provision of the 1870 Constitution
generated more litigation than the requirement that the General
Assembly shall not pass a special or local law. The old constitution
contained extensive lists of instances which were stated to be local or
special in nature and thereby prohibited.4" The new constitution
eliminated the list but continued the prohibition and further provides:
"Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter
for judicial determination." 9
Prior to the passage of this provision, the General Assembly was
the final constitutional authority for determining whether or not a
general act had been passed. The problem posed to the legislature
under the 1870 Constitution was: when is a general law applicable?
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention concluded that meaning-
ful policing of the limitations on special legislation should be left to
the courts. This addition specifically rejected the rule enunciated in a
long line of decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court which held that
whether a general law can be made applicable to a specific situation
should be a legislative rather than a judicial determination. 0  In
Bridgewater v. Hotz,5' the Supreme Court of Illinois applied, for the
first time, the provisions of section 13. The Illinois Election Code
provides, inter alia, one method for electing members of a county
board for a class of counties with populations of less than three million
people or with the township form of government, and another method
48. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (1870).
49. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. The section is taken directly from the MODEL
STATE CONSTITUTION art. IV, § 4.11. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CONSTITUTION 55-56 (6th ed. 1968).
50. See, e.g., Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 178 N.E.2d 313 (1948) and
cases cited therein.
51. 51 111. 2d 103, 281 N.E.2d 317 (1972).
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for a second class comprised of Cook County and counties under the
commission form of government. The Bridgewater plaintiffs charged
that this provision violated the prohibition against special or local
legislation. The court recognized that the scope of judicial review
of legislation had been enlarged by section 13; however, it concluded
that the act in question did not constitute a special or local law.52
In a second case in the same term, Grace v. Howlett,5" the court
reviewed the constitutionality of Illinois' no-fault insurance law
which was applicable to private passenger vehicles but not to four
wheel motor vehicles "used primarily in the occupation, profession
of the insured." Over the dissent of Chief Justice Underwood, the
court invalidated the legislation, on the grounds, inter alia, that a
general law could be made applicable and that the no-fault law in
question was a "special law." In its analysis, the court relied squarely
on section 13 of Article IV although it noted that section 13 provides
protection given in many cases by the new equal protection clause of
the Illinois Constitution. To the extent that the no-fault insurance law
was invalid under the equal protection clause (a question which the
majority explicitly declined to consider)," the Grace case represents
no enlargement of the court's jurisdiction since even prior to the new
constitution, the court could invalidate legislation for violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In Grace,
however, the court clearly relied on section 13 rather than the equal
protection clause, and to that extent, implied the non co-extensive
nature of those two provisions. In so doing, the majority raised the
question of how section 13 should be judicially applied. In his
dissent, Mr. Chief Justice Underwood indicates the problem:
[AlIthough the scope of judicial review of legislation is to that extent [by the
express grant of judicial review power in section 13] enlarged, section 13 requires no
change in our definition of when a law is "general and uniform," "special," or
"local." 5 5
He seemingly points to the crucial issue skirted by the majority in
Grace when he continues:
Additionally, we there commented: "Whether the course chosen is wise or whether
it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial
52. 51 111. 2d at 110, 281 N.E.2d at 322.
53. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
54. Id. at 488, 283 N.E.2d at 480.




The dissent focuses on the question of the reasonableness of the
classification and its relation to the purposes of the act as the
necessary crux of the court's determination as to whether or not the
act violates the constitutional proscription against special or local
laws. This understanding suggests that, at least in this case, section
13 and the equal protection clause are co-extensive and the constitu-
tional role of the court in legislative evaluation is unchanged.
In still another area, the 1970 Constitution appears to sanction court
intervention in a new direction although it does not contain so specific
a grant or mandate to the courts as the sections previously discussed.
The Bill of Rights of the new constitution provides: "No person shall
be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine in a criminal case unless he has
been afforded adequate time to make payment, in installments if
necessary, and has willfully failed to make payment."5  The mem-
bers of the Bill of Rights Committee which proposed this provision
stated:
The. . . proposal would tend to equalize punishment as between rich and poor by
requiring that the amount of a fine be proportionate to the wealth of the offender.
$100.00 may be a fortune to an indigent but not have any significance to a wealthy
defendant.5 8
Prior to the passage of this provision, if two men were convicted
of speeding and each fined $300.00, the requirement for payment
was the same even if one were a millionaire and the other a pauper.
The law did not permit the judges to inquire into the defendants'
different economic status. The absence of authority of courts to
assess economic status prevented the enlargement of judicial power
enabling judges to determine any such economic distinctions among
persons. The court's function was to find out whether or not an
accused person was guilty and to assess a fine. Under section 14, how-
ever, the power of the courts is enlarged since judges are charged with
56. Id., 283 N.E.2d at 482-83.
57. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14. The provision of the new constitution anticipated,
in part, the decision of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Williams prohibits the imprisonment of an indigent
defendant for non-payment of fine and court costs where the imprisonment for
failure to pay exceeds the maximum term provided in the statute for the primary
offense.
58. 6 TRANSCRIPT 196.
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the responsibility of determining whether or not a defendant should be
granted the opportunity to pay fines by installments.1 9 Such an exten-
sion of power seems to open the way for further court involvement in
the highly controversial area of assessment of socio-economic factors
surrounding crime and punishment." °
The standards of judicial review are generally discretionary and the
courts can often avoid the difficult and politically volatile questions,
under the Marbury doctrine, with accepted doctrines of "standing,"
"political question," "ripeness" and "case or controversy." In such
cases, the role of the courts (discussed in part I of this article), is
properly one of restraint and deference to the other branches of
government. However, where the power of a court is anchored in the
language of the Constitution, as is the situation in the instances
described above, the court cannot escape its judicial obligation nor can
its constitutional duty be attenuated.
SUPERVISORY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES
One of the primary objectives of the drafters of the new constitution
was to insure that the judicial branch be permitted to spend full-time
performing the business of the court. Thus, the constitution provides
explicitly that judges "shall devote full time to judicial duty." 61
Moreover, the constitution also provides that officers of units of local
government "shall not be appointed by any person in the Judicial
Branch.""2 During the course of the convention, however, some
important exceptions to these principles were incorporated in the
document. First, the judicial article provides that associate judges
shall be appointed by the circuit court judges in each circuit.A3 Under
the 1870 Constitution, comparable appointments were to be made
"[s]ubject to law ... 4 Thus the General Assembly and the Gov-
59. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 61 (1972).
60. Id. This result is also suggested by Article I, section 11 of the new
constitution which states that "All penalties shall be determined both according to
the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to
useful citizenship." The last phrase is new.
61. ILL. CONST. art. VI § 13(b). The new constitution retains the provision
which grants the supreme court general administrative and supervisory powers over
the Judicial Branch. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
62. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
63. ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 8.
64. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1870).
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ernor, by the law-making power, had total control over the procedural
aspects of the appointments. Under the new constitution, these
appointments are to be made as "the Supreme Court shall provide by
rule." Thus, the rule-making power of the supreme court has been
increased to guarantee that the judiciary shall have control over the
appointment of the associate judges in the Illinois judicial system and
the matters to be assigned associate judges with no direct check by the
other two branches of government.6" Also, under the 1970 Constitu-
tion when a vacancy occurs in the office of supreme, appellate or
circuit judge, that vacancy is filled by appointment by the supreme
court unless a law exists which provides another method.6 The
person appointed to fill the vacancy serves for a term of up to two
years, depending upon the time remaining in the term left vacant.
With this new power and control over the appointment of associate
judges comes a substantial increase in the role of the supreme court
in determining the composition and quality of the judiciary in Illinois.
Thus the court is propelled into a very controversial area of making
qualitative and seemingly political judgments about the officers of the
bench. Such a power demands a careful consideration of the stand-
ards which must be developed by the court in making appointments
and of institutionalizing a tradition of excellence.
One of the significant alterations in the balance of power among
the branches of government in the past two decades has been the
role of the courts throughout the country in the reapportionment of
legislatures. Under the new constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court
retains the power to review any reapportionment scheme proposed by
the General Assembly. To this extent there is no change in the
current balance of power. The legislative article does, however, pro-
vide for the establishment of a reapportionment commission to be
composed in part of representatives appointed in equal numbers by the
two party leaders of the houses of the General Assembly.6 7  If the
commission fails to arrive at an acceptable redistricting plan, the su-
preme court is required under the constitution "to submit the
names of two persons, not of the same political party, to the Secretary
65. The new constitution also provides for the appointment, rather than the
election, of supreme and appellate court clerks. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(a).
66. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(c).
67. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
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of State .... ,,68 The Secretary of State then draws at random the
name of one of two persons to serve as the tie-breaker on the re-
apportionment commission. Thus, the new constitution injects the
court directly into a highly political aspect of the redistricting process
and also gives the court the power to review such a plan once it has
been approved by the commission. 9
The new constitution has substantially increased the additional
rule-making power of the Supreme Court of Illinois over its appellate
jurisdiction. The court is granted exclusive power over its own
appellate jurisdiction with the exception of appeals from judgments
of circuit courts imposing the death penalty.7 ° While the constitution
provides for appeal, as a matter of right, from final judgments of
circuit courts to the appellate court, the supreme court is provided
rule-making power for other appeals.
Moreover, the supreme court has been expressly granted the power
to establish rules for the conduct of judges and associate judges.7'
These shifts in responsibility from the General Assembly to
the court have further insulated the judicial branch from scrutiny
68. Id.
69. In People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Il. 2d 156, 277 N.E.2d 881 (1971),
the court held the legislative redistricting commission was not properly selected
because the leaders of the legislature appointed themselves and their aides to the
commission. The court said that the appointments of the aides were "[in]
literal compliance with the language of section 3(b) .... ." However they were
"a subversion of the purpose of that language .... Id. at 163, 277 N.E.2d
at 886. The court also invalidated the self-appointment by the legislative leaders.
Section 3(b) provides a detailed and somewhat intricate method for redistricting.
Its language is closely drawn. The court went to the debates of the convention
and found no clear answer to the issue before it. Nevertheless, it substituted its
judgment for that of the General Assembly and the text of the constitution on
the theory that "had such action [self-appointment] been contemplated, section 3(b)
would have so stated, particularly when it is considered that the public policy
against self-appointment is of long standing and well known." Thus here, as
in Klinger, see text at note 32 supra, the court has read its standards, not articu-
lated in the constitution, into the detailed procedures surrounding the legislative
process. Additionally, it is far from clear where the court found a rule which
prohibited legislative leaders from appointing themselves to sit on legislative com-
missions or committees.
70. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b). Under the 1870 Constitution, appeals, as
of right, lay in cases with (a) revenue questions, (b) constitutional questions, and
(c) habeas corpus. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1870). Where the court was
granted rule-making power under the 1870 Constitution, however, it has invalidated
legislative attempts to assert some control under the 1870 Constitution. Illinois v.
Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1972).
71. ILL. CoNST. art. VI, § 13(a).
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and control by the executive and legislature through the law making
process.
The new supervisory and political powers of the court must be
viewed in two lights. First, the court must assume substantial
authority in areas in which it was formerly not involved. In so doing,
the court which now sits can establish procedures and standards which
will affect generations of Illinois citizens. Like the power which
accrues to the court in interpreting the language of the new con-
stitution, these supervisory and political powers carry with them
substantial responsibilities.
Viewed from another perspective, these new powers severely affect
the responsibility of the court in its evaluation of the balance between
judicial restraint and judicial activism. A prudent measure of that
balance should depend to some extent on the judgment of the
court as to its desired power in the political system and its impact
on the political process. The popular reaction to the court and
its relation to the other branches of government and to the substantive
questions of policy in the state can be harshly affected, however, by
the extent of the court's increased involvement in the political proc-
ess. Given the new and-in traditional terms-quite extreme man-
datory involvement in areas of supervisory and political power, it
would appear to be prudent for the court to reassess with great care
its stand on judicial activism in traditional decision-making. As its
supervisory and political powers have been increased, the view of its
interpretive role must, perforce, change. This change should be
evaluated and considered in decisions about restraint.
CONCLUSION
The shifts in power under the new constitution and the strengthening
of the court system are important events in the institutional develop-
ment of Illinois courts and, particularly, the role of the supreme
court. In the final analysis, however, the institutional strength
of the courts depends upon the respect of the other two branches
and of the citizens for its opinion and its moral authority. The
supreme court cannot enforce direct sanctions or administer the
law. Only the executive branch can do that. The court cannot
impose taxes or make appropriations. Only the General Assembly
has that power. Given these limitations, how the court approaches its
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responsibilities under the new constitution and the integrity of its
decisions will substantially affect the court's institutional role in our
system of government-notwithstanding the stated new constitutional
requirements for the court's role.
To meet this new responsibility, a new jurisprudence is required
of the Supreme Court of Illinois. In the past the court has been
seriously hampered by an excessive caseload resulting from the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction contained in the 1870 constitution.72
Adequate consideration of all matters before the court was difficult
because of the extensive burden placed upon each of the individual jus-
tices of preparing decisions and of engaging in private colloquy with
other members of the court. This has unreasonably strained the capac-
ity of the justices to arrive at a reasoned decision in which the other
members of the court have confidence. The new constitution has pro-
vided the court with almost absolute control over its caseload and the
decisions which it will review. This power has been wisely exercised
by adoption of new rules which limit appellate review. 7' The tradi-
tional devices of mootness, ripeness and jurisdiction are increasingly
available to the supreme court in its decision-making process. More-
over, the court should have increased time to reflect upon the impor-
tant questions of state and institutional authority which are argued be-
fore it. The new constitution, by authorizing the court to limit its case-
load, will permit the judges to engage in a meaningful public colloquy.
The constitution, by increasing the court's powers, has accentuated the
importance of that colloquy. An increased number of dissenting opin-
ions should be expected as genuine controverises concerning important
issues arise before the court. The citizens of the State of Illinois and
members of the Bar have the right to expect from the court, given its
power to control its caseload and its other new institutional authorities,
an increased articulation of the issues by its members and a sharpening
of existing disputes and reasoning. Such colloquy, could result
in the constraint and limitation on decisions necessary for a prudent
implementation of the new constitution and the proper judicial re-
straint by the courts.
72. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1870).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302 (1971).
[Vol. XXlI: 63
